Publications
Revision requested
On the Competitive Effects of Screening and Litigation in Procurement, with Adam Pigon, revision requested by the Journal of Industrial Economics. (paper)
Working papers
A Combined Field and Laboratory Experiment on Risk Compensation, with Lawrence Jin. (paper)
On the Existence of Equilibrium in Procurement Auctions, TILEC Discussion Paper 2017-038. (paper)
On the Failure of the Linkage Principle with Colluding Bidders, TILEC Discussion Paper 2017-026. (paper)
Supplementary material here
In Progress (in various stages)
Do Women Comply More? Experimental Evidence from a General Population Sample, with Müge Süer, Anna Balleyer, Nicola Cerutti, and Jana Friedrichsen
Personalized Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) as a Trial Participation Incentive, with Xavier Tadeo, Peter Wang, Yoann Sapanel, Smrithi Vijayakumar, Alexandria Remus, Jasmine L. Eyal, Jason Kai-Wei Lee, Simon Chesterman, Julian Savulescu, John Eu-Li Wong, Christopher Lee Asplund, R. Brian Stone, Benjamin C.K. Tee, Reza Shokri, Marlena Raczkowska, Chong Li Ming, Siong Peng Kwek, Agata Blasiak, and Dean Ho
Testing Anchoring Bias in Games, with Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel
Competitive and Collusive Bidding in Multidimensional Auctions
- Optimal Discounts in Green Public Procurement, with Olga Chiappinelli, Economics Letters, 238 (2024) 111705 (paper)
- Uncertain Commitment Power in Dynamic Pricing, forthcoming in the B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Misinformation, Disinformation, and Generative AI: Implications for Perception and Policy, with Kokil Jaidka, Tsuhan Chen, Simon Chesterman, Wynne Hsu, Min-Yen Kan, Mohan Kankanhalli, Mong Li Lee, Terence Sim, Araz Taeihagh, Anthony Tung, Xiaokui Xiao, Audrey Yue, forthcoming in the Digital Government: Research and Practice
- Anchored Strategic Reasoning, with Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Economics Letters, 212 (2022) 110330 (paper)
- Are Strategies Anchored?, with Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, European Economic Review, 135 (2021) 103725 (paper)
- Face Mask Use and Physical Distancing before and after Mandatory Masking: Evidence from Public Waiting Lines, with Anna Balleyer, Nicola Cerutti, Jana Friedrichsen and Müge Süer, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 192 (2021) 765-781. (paper)[Media coverage: Il Sole 24 Ore, Trouw, de Volkskrant, Yle Uutiset]
- Face Masks Increase Compliance with Physical Distancing Recommendations During the COVID-19 Pandemic, with Anna Balleyer, Nicola Cerutti, Anastasia Danilov, Jana Friedrichsen, Yiming Liu and Müge Süer, Journal of the Economic Science Association, 7 (2021) 139-158, (paper)
- The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions, with Charles N. Noussair, Games and Economic Behavior, 119 (2020) 267-287. (paper)
- Auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 52 (2017) 282-306. (paper) Supplementary material here.
Revision requested
On the Competitive Effects of Screening and Litigation in Procurement, with Adam Pigon, revision requested by the Journal of Industrial Economics. (paper)
Working papers
A Combined Field and Laboratory Experiment on Risk Compensation, with Lawrence Jin. (paper)
On the Existence of Equilibrium in Procurement Auctions, TILEC Discussion Paper 2017-038. (paper)
On the Failure of the Linkage Principle with Colluding Bidders, TILEC Discussion Paper 2017-026. (paper)
Supplementary material here
In Progress (in various stages)
Do Women Comply More? Experimental Evidence from a General Population Sample, with Müge Süer, Anna Balleyer, Nicola Cerutti, and Jana Friedrichsen
Personalized Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) as a Trial Participation Incentive, with Xavier Tadeo, Peter Wang, Yoann Sapanel, Smrithi Vijayakumar, Alexandria Remus, Jasmine L. Eyal, Jason Kai-Wei Lee, Simon Chesterman, Julian Savulescu, John Eu-Li Wong, Christopher Lee Asplund, R. Brian Stone, Benjamin C.K. Tee, Reza Shokri, Marlena Raczkowska, Chong Li Ming, Siong Peng Kwek, Agata Blasiak, and Dean Ho
Testing Anchoring Bias in Games, with Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel
Competitive and Collusive Bidding in Multidimensional Auctions
